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EPISTEMIC FEATURE OF DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE 
OF EXPERT IN DEMOCRATIC DECISION MAKING
ABSTRACT
In her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic 
Virtues, Snježana Prijić Samaržija advocates that a purely procedural 
justification which defines the authority and legitimacy of democracy 
only in relation to the fairness of the procedure itself is not enough for a 
full justification of democracy. Some epistemic values should also be 
included. This epistemic quality of democracy depends on the quality of 
the decisions that the democratic procedures produce. In that sense, the 
author is advocating a hybrid theory that secures harmony between 
political and epistemic values, favoring deliberative procedure for this 
purpose, and thus promotes equal respect for both democratic values. In 
doing so, she is advocating the specific type of division of epistemic labor 
that I will attempt to critically re-examine here, as well as to bring into 
question the privileged role of the experts in democratic decision-making. 
The book Democracy and Truth gives good insights and an overview of social 
epistemology and theories about epistemic justification of democracy, espe-
cially deliberative democracy. It has in focus a recent discussion on epistemic 
values of democracy1 – the potential of its procedures to produce epistemically 
valuable decisions – as addition to a more traditional, purely procedural justi-
fication that defines legitimacy and authority of democracy only in relation to 
fairness of its procedures, regardless of the outcomes they produce. This book 
deals with an alleged opposition between democracy as a system that enables and 
protects moral and political values (such as fairness, equality, freedom, dignity, 
autonomy etc.) and truth, arguing in favor of a hybrid position that respects 
both values. In this text, however, I’d like to raise several issues concerning con-
cerning the last chapter of the book – “Reliability Democracy and the Role of 
Experts in a Democratic Society”. In this chapter the author promotes a hybrid 
1  David Estlund was first to argue that the normative concept of democratic author-
ity must include an epistemic dimension (Estlund 2008).
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approach that aims to develop truth-sensitive procedures that presuppose the 
division of epistemic labor between citizens and experts and at the same time 
preserve political values. The author concludes that we can say that there are 
experts in the domain of politics, that citizens should trust their experts and 
that involvement in political decision making ensures higher epistemic quality. 
The author supports the solution for (alleged) conflict between political and 
epistemic values of democracy, proposed by Thomas Christiano, which (in or-
der to keep both) implies the necessity of division of the epistemic labor. Ac-
cording to his view, we need to be aware of the distinction between the moral 
and the technical knowledge (Christiano 2008). We can say and (mostly) agree 
on who the technical experts are, but we can’t agree so clearly about moral 
expertise. We cannot simply give more political power or political authority 
to those who are well educated and “know better” (Estlund 2008, Christiano 
2008), as Plato suggested (Plato 2000). But this doesn’t mean that expertise is 
irrelevant or that in politics everyone is equal in terms of knowledge. So, the 
author agrees with Christiano that there should exist some division of epistem-
ic labor between the expert and the citizens, which would secure both values 
– the demand for political equality and the epistemic reliability of democrat-
ic decision making. In this sense, the role of citizens is to choose the aims of 
the society they live in and to evaluate whether the socially valuable and de-
sirable goals are met or not (through deliberation). The role of the citizens is 
to identify problems, choose aims and evaluate experts, politicians and their 
proposed ways to reach those aims and values. On the other side, the experts 
are those that possess the necessary knowledge that ordinary citizens do not, 
and so they are, in the end, those who solve problems and find the best means 
to fulfill the aims that the citizens have agreed upon. 
1.
I would like to bring into question this presupposed trust we should have in ex-
perts. The reason for that is not because they are not better at knowing things. 
They are. The reason is the cognitive functioning of all human individuals, 
including experts. As a matter of fact, the extensive and very significant em-
pirical literature generated over the last three decades shows that the actual 
decision-making process often deviates from the normative assumptions of a 
theory that starts from an ideal decision maker who has all the information, 
who can calculate with perfect precision and who is completely rational. Her-
bert Simon and his colleague, the political scientist James Marsh, have devel-
oped the thesis of “bounded rationality”, which departs from the assumptions 
made by neoclassical economics – perfect rationality assumed by models of 
homo economicus (March & Simon 1958). This limited rationality assumes not 
only that an individual may not have all the information he or she needs, but 
that even if they did, they would not be able to process them adequately. The 
human mind necessarily limits itself. The expert’s mind as well.
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Today’s dominant approaches to the study of decision-making, judging and 
reasoning have convincingly demonstrated the existence of numerous errors 
that are, more importantly, systematic, identical and predictable to most mem-
bers of our species. These phenomena have been termed cognitive illusions 
or biases, and everyone is prone to them - from “ordinary people” to experts 
(they are not truly objective and “neutral” and they also suffer from various 
cognitive limitations). According to argumentative theory of reasoning, this 
unquestionable fact about our cognitive functioning causes the reasoning to 
work best within the group (Mercier & Sperber 2011). According to this the-
ory, group decision-making can compensate for the limitations of individual 
decision-making, judging and reasoning. Their model indicates that during 
public deliberation, when discussing diverse opinions, group reasoning out-
weighs individual, no matter who that individual is. In other words, this bold 
assumption leads to the conclusion that not only is cognition not damaged by 
social processes and social needs, but rather that all the cognitive illusions we 
are systematically inclined to come precisely through the use of reason in iso-
lation, i.e. out of group.
2.
These findings are consistent with deliberative democracy assumptions and 
epistemic justification of deliberation. Helen Landemore, referring to the re-
sults obtained by Hong and Page argues that democracies and democratic deci-
sions satisfy both conditions of legitimacy (procedural and epistemic), because 
what enables democratic decision-making, under certain conditions, to be of 
greater epistemic value than any other alternative form of decision making is 
the existence of cognitive diversity within a political decision-making group 
(Landemore 2013; Hong & Page 2004, Page 2008). 
Cognitive diversity implies the existence of different perspectives, heuris-
tics, interpretations, predicative models. But, Page says that his model of cog-
nitive diversity can be applied to economic and democratic decision making 
only for the cases where group jointly solves problems or predicts an unknown 
outcome (deliberation and aggregation). However, there are conditions under 
which a group of diverse members achieves better outcomes than individuals 
or a small group of like-minded people, even if they are also its best members 
(experts). Their findings suggest that in the case of opinion aggregation, cog-
nitive diversity is just as important as individual ability. However, for a bet-
ter quality of collective response in the context of deliberation, i.e. problem 
solving, cognitive diversity is more important than individual ability. In oth-
er words, when it comes to problem solving, and certain conditions are sat-
isfied, diversity trumps ability (Page 2007, 2008). The logic behind this claim 
is that large or randomly formed groups are more likely to be diverse, while 
a small group made up of those who meet a certain criterion (expertise, edu-
cation, material status etc.) will often be made up of people who think alike. 
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In other words, individuals who are identified as the best at solving problems 
(experts) will most likely have similar perspectives and heuristics and so likely 
to be “stuck” in the same places (Landemore 2012). 
Of course, this will not always work. One of the conditions that Page and 
Hong define is that this diversity must be relevant, that is, there must be some 
kind of competence of decision makers (Hong & Page 2004; Page 2008). This 
condition is not strict as in the case of Condorcet’s Theorem (Condorcet 1785), 
but only requires that citizens can understand the problem in question and 
that they can distinguish better from worse decisions. So, when talking about 
the problem of competence of ordinary citizens, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the (non) possession of factual knowledge and their cognitive ability 
to solve political problems when they are provided with relevant information 
and knowledge. And, as many deliberative experiments suggest, the problem 
with the lack of factual knowledge can be solved with the help of certain de-
liberative institutional mechanisms. This is important because the theorists 
who have argued anti-democratic conclusions have generally focused on the 
incompetence of ordinary citizens in terms of the knowledge and information 
they (don’t) possess.
So, according to Page and Hong findings, when the problem is complex 
and involves conditions of uncertainty (and most political problems in con-
temporary societies are just like that), the group’s epistemic performance will 
transcend the abilities of the individual. For the group to be better than any 
individual or any few people, even the smartest ones, individuals in it have to 
be relatively smart (minimal competence) and cognitively diverse. 
I have claimed that the proposed way of division of cognitive labor may 
be reconsidered. When thinking about the competence of ordinary citizens, 
it is necessary to distinguish between (non) possession of factual knowledge 
and their cognitive ability to solve political problems when information and 
knowledge is presented to them (Landemore 2012).  Individual competence 
will be defined by an individual’s ability to critically examine different argu-
ments, with different reasons and evidence, and tell the difference between 
good and bad decisions. Regardless of their exposure to the same set of argu-
ments (that are different among themselves), each individual has different cog-
nitive “tools” to help her look at the problem in different ways, from a differ-
ent perspective, focus on different dimensions of the problem, etc., allowing 
to satisfy the condition of independence. We can use the deliberative practice 
and institutions to increase the competence of ordinary citizens on issues that 
need to be solved, without disrupting the group’s cognitive diversity. Deliber-
ative democrats showed that the ordinary citizens, when they were given the 
chance to become better informed through the process of public deliberation, 
can truly contribute to finding solutions even for issues and problems that are 
specifically technical (Fishkin & Lushkin 2005). Comparing the pre-delibera-
tive and post-deliberative survey, it is evident that in the deliberation process, 
citizens become more informed about the discussed political issues (Ackerman 
& Fishkin 2005; Fishkin 2009; Fishkin, Luskin & Jowell 2000).
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Concerning all said, my question is, then, why limit the role of the public 
only to decisions about which experts will make good political decisions and 
solve common problems? If we doubt the competence of ordinary citizens, if 
we say that they lack knowledge about complex issues which are essential for 
political problems resolution, how do citizens evaluate which experts are ef-
fective and who should be trusted and who will make best decisions? I am not 
arguing we don’t need experts or that there are no experts in particular fields, 
but only that they shouldn’t be the only ones who make decisions about com-
plex common problems. Bearing in mind the proposed arguments based on 
idea of collective intelligence, more involvement of ordinary citizens in every 
stage of decision-making process can, as we saw, be epistemically beneficial, 
under the right conditions. Inclusive deliberation may thus increase both po-
litical and epistemic values of democratic decision making. Not because every 
single member of that group is smart (or all are equally knowledgeable) but 
because they all, as a group, can come to better solutions. 
Conclusion
If we consider the thesis about the importance of cognitive diversity for the 
quality of decisions, then the very fact that the same group of people – profes-
sional politicians and experts, who become more and more alike in their atti-
tudes and actions through time – identifies problems of the wider communi-
ty, creates a political agenda and makes final decisions that are binding for all, 
leads to the conclusion that we should include a larger number of (cognitive-
ly diverse) people in the democratic decision-making process. In that sense, I 
would argue for more deliberation between citizens and experts, that would 
maintain the diversity assumption in all stages of democratic decision mak-
ing - defining best and most realistic social goals and values and creating the 
best solutions for problems.  And, it is not because the experts don’t possess a 
greater knowledge than lay people – they do and that knowledge is crucial for 
good decision making – but because they are not impartial, don’t have all a in-
formation and perspectives and suffer from cognitive biases, like the rest of us. 
– they do and that knowledge is crucial for good decision making - but because 
they are not impartial and have cognitive biases, like the rest of us. Given the 
complexity and uncertainty that exists in the realm of political decision mak-
ing, we agree with Aristotle that the assumption that there is someone who is 
wiser than everyone else and whose decisions would be better than those of 
any other individual member of the community is not inconsistent with the 
fact that those decisions would be even better if that individual would include 
in problem solving someone (even) less wise, and then someone else and then 
someone else (Aristotle 1988). 
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Ivana Janković
Epistemička odlika demokratije: uloga eksperta u demokratskom 
donošenju odluka
Apstrakt
U svojoj knjizi Demokratija i istina: sukob između političkih i epistemičkih vrlina, Snježana Prijić 
Samaržija se zalaže za stanovište po kom čisto proceduralno opravdanje, koje definiše auto-
ritet i legitimnost demokratije samo u odnosu na pravičnost same procedure, nije dovoljno 
za potpuno opravdanje demokratije i da, stoga, treba uključiti i neke epistemičke vrednosti. 
Ova epistemička vrednost demokratije zavisi od kvaliteta odluka koje demokratske proce-
dure proizvode. U tom smislu autorka se zalaže za hibirnu teoriju koja obezbeđuje sklad iz-
među političkih i epistemičkih vrednosti, favorizujući deliberativnu proceduru za tu svrhu, i 
na taj način promoviše jednako poštovanje obe demokratske vrednosti. Pri tome, autorka 
zagovara specifičnu vrstu epsitemičke podele rada koju ću ovde pokušati da kritički preispi-
tam, a samim tim i izolovanu ulogu eskperata u demokratskom odlučivanju.
Ključne reči: epistemička demokratija, kognitivni diverzitet, ograničena racionalnost, delibe-
rativna demokratija
